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1 Introductory remarks
‘‘I would lay it down as a general principle that where it is possible to decide any case, civil or
criminal, without reaching a constitutional issue, that is the course which should be followed.’’1
This seemingly unspectacular dictum comes from the minority
judgment in the controversial Mhlungu case,2 one of the earliest
judgments of the South African Constitutional Court. Though it is not
often cited (both in the literature and the case law) the said dictum seems
to articulate a ‘‘principle’’ of considerable significance.3 The purpose of
this article is to show that this dictum and the ‘‘principle’’ to which it
refers are commensurate with and indeed a verbalisation of the notion of
subsidiarity which, subject to caveats, has a constructive role to play in
constitutional interpretation and adjudication. It will moreover be argued
that (and shown why) it is desirable to name (and thereby explicitly
recognise) the hitherto unnamed ‘‘Mhlungu principle’’ as an instance of
adjudicative subsidiarity, and to distinguish it from other forms of
subsidiarity which are also of interpretive and adjudicative significance.
2 ‘‘Subsidiarity’’: general observations
When looking for a dictionary definition of subsidiarity a first
observation of significance is that most dictionaries — and especially
1 Per Kentridge AJ in S v Mhlungu 1995 7 BCLR 793 (1995 3 SA 867) (CC) par 59; cf also Motsepe v
Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1997 6 BCLR 692 (CC) par 21; National Coalition for Gay and
Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 1 BCLR 39 (CC) par 21; Minister of Education v
Harris 2001 11 BCLR 1157 (CC) par 19.
2 The case was controversial not because of the dictum abovesaid, but because the Court was split
almost in the middle on the question precisely how literal an assumedly ‘‘technical’’ provision of the
transitional Constitution had to be be construed. Subsequently the majority of the Court was criticised
for violating the language of (what was perceived to be) rather straightforward, clearly worded ‘‘black-
letter’’ law cf eg Fagan ‘‘The longest Erratum Note in History. S v Mhlungu and Others
Constitutional Court 25/94; 1995 (3) SA 867 (CC); 1995 (7) BCLR 793 (CC)’’ 1996 SAJHR 79 and
‘‘The Ordinary Meaning of Language A Response to Professor Davis’’ 1997 SAJHR 174. Other
commentators subsequently stepped in with a spirited defence of the majority’s non-literalist approach
cf Davis ‘‘The Twist of Language and the Two Fagans: Please Sir May I Have Some More
Literalism’’ 1996 SAJHR 504; De Ville ‘‘Eduard Fagan in Context’’ 1997 SA Public Law 493 and
Mischke ‘‘This is a (Foot)note in G Minor’’ 1997 SA Public Law 514.
3 Cf eg Currie & De Waal The New Constitutional and Administrative Law 1 (2001) 328.
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older and South African ones — contain no entry for ‘‘subsidiarity’’ /
‘‘subsidiariteit’’.4 The New Oxford Dictionary of English describes
subsidiarity ‘‘in politics’’ as ‘‘the principle that a central authority should
have a subsidiary function, performing only those tasks which cannot be
performed at a more local level’’.5 In The Shorter Oxford English
Dictionary,6 a similar definition is preceded by the observation that
subsidiarity is ‘‘[t]he quality of being subsidiary’’. These dictionary
definitions imply that subsidiarity — a principle tracing its origins to
Roman Catholic social thought7 and, more particularly Pope Pius XI’s
encyclical Quadragesimo Novarum from the year 1931 — centrifugalises
the power of social institutions or bodies functioning within the ambit of
one and the same social sphere.
Meyers Lexikon: Das Wissen A-Z8 describes Subsidiarita¨t9 as ‘‘das
Zuru¨cktreten einer von mehreren an sich anwendbaren Rechtsnormen
kraft ausdru¨ckl. oder durch Auslegung zu ermittelnder gesetzl. Anord-
nung’’. This very German description defies literal translation into
English.10 What it envisions is a situation in which several legal norms are
in themselves11 applicable, but an explicit legal12 directive — or a
directive established through interpretation — excludes one of the
(contending) legal norms from consideration for application in that
particular situation — the said norm ‘‘steps down’’, as it were. According
to this description, subsidiarity does not necessarily require (but also does
not exclude) either a hierarchy or a variance in the scope or
comprehensiveness of the norms considered for application. It simply
states that subsidiarity manifests as the law’s preference for legal norms A
and B and C for — and the exclusion of legal norm X from — possible
application in a given situation.
There is a paucity of references to subsidiarity in South African case
law, but the references that do occur reflect a perception of subsidiarity
commensurate with (though not identical to) the description in Meyers.
In Absa Bank Ltd t/a Bankfin v Stander t/a CAW Paneelkloppers,13 Van
Zyl J agreed with two legal scholars’ assertion that, in German law, the
availability of an action for indirect enrichment only when an action for
direct enrichment is not possible or enforceable, constitutes a
4 Van Wyk Subsidiariteit as Waarde wat die Oop en Demokratiese Suid-Afrikaanse Gemeenskap ten
Grondslag Leˆ in Carpenter (ed) Suprema Lex. Essays on the Constitution Presented to / Opstelle oor die
Grondwet Aangebied aan Marinus Wiechers (1998) 251 252 seems to have had a similar experience.
5 Pearsall (ed) The New Oxford Dictionary of English (1998) 1851.
6 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on CD-ROM 5 ed Version 2.0 (2002).
7 Kommers The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany 2 ed (1997) 113; Van
Wyk Subsidiariteit 254.
8 PC Bibliothek. Meyers Lexikon: Das Wissen A-Z (1993).
9 Derived from Latin.
10 It can more literally be translated into Afrikaans as ‘‘die terugtrede van een van meerdere as sodanig
aanwendbare regsnorme kragtens uitdruklike of deur uitleg bepaalde wetsverordening’’.
11 Or ‘‘as such’’.
12 ‘‘Legitimate’’ is also implied.
13 1998 1 SA 939 (C) 947B.
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‘‘subsidiarity principle’’. In Ex Parte Minister of Safety and Security: In
Re: S v Walters,14 the permissibility of force to make an arrest only where
there are no lesser means of achieving the arrest, was said to be an instance
of ‘‘subsidiarity’’. In the two examples just mentioned, subsidiary is not
concerned with the identification and empowerment of an appropriate
institutional actor (a body or an organ) to make a decision, perform a
function and/or fulfil a duty. The subsidiarity in question is decision- or
issue-centric instead, and strategically significant in the identification and
implementation of normative means to negotiate the exigencies of a
situation at hand. It makes sense, therefore, to distinguish between
institution-centric and problem- or issue-centric subsidiarity — institutional
and strategic subsidiarity for short. The ‘‘Mhlungu principle’’ verbalises
preference for a particular adjudicative reading strategy, thereby
instantiating the latter form of subsidiarity. Though strategic subsidiarity
involves a reading strategy, while institutional subsidiarity, on face value,
does not do so, both forms of subsidiarity are significant for
constitutional interpretation and adjudication. The ‘‘readers’ instruc-
tions’’ encountered along the route of strategic subsidiarity, are directed
at an authorised readership identified and empowered in accordance with
procedures put forward by institutional subsidiarity. To really fathom the
significance of subsidiarity for constitutional interpretation and adjudi-
cation, both forms of subsidiarity must therefore duly be considered, and
it is preferable to start off with institutional subsidiarity which,
historically, first gained explicit recognition (and which, according to
most dictionaries, seem to be the default version of ‘‘subsidiarity’’).
Before proceeding, however, a question relating to both institutional
and strategic subsidiarity — and not requiring an answer right now —
must be posed: Is ‘‘[t]he quality of being subsidiary’’ (in The Shorter
Oxford English Dictionary’s15 definition of ‘‘subsidiarity’’) attributable
primarily to subsidiary (and subordinate) or rather to comprehensive
(and superordinate) doers/institutions/norms? I hope to show (even-
tually) that this question does not allude to but a terminological triviality,
and that engagement with it could add to the profundity of one’s
understanding of (and to profitable reliance on) subsidiarity in its various
manifestations in diverse situations — and in constitutional interpreta-
tion and adjudication in particular. But the subsidiarity landscape first
calls for further exploration.
3 Institutional subsidiarity
Institutional subsidiarity, as a force in societal life, constrains any more
encompassing or superordinate institution (or body or community) to
refrain from taking for its account matters which a more particular,
subordinate institution (or body or community) can appropriately
14 2002 7 BCLR 663 (2002 4 613) (CC) par 22.
15 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on CD-ROM.
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dispose of, irrespective of whether the latter is an organ of State or of civil
society.16 This description reminisces (and is in actual fact a repetition of)
the dictionary definitions of ‘‘subsidiarity’’ previously looked at — with
the exception of that of Meyers, but Meyers provides a definition for the
‘‘principle of subsidiarity’’ which is very similar to other dictionaries’
definition of ‘‘subsidiarity’’ (and therefore also to the definition of
institutional subsidiarity just put forward).17 It was suggested before that
(institutional) subsidiarity enhances the centrifugalisation of the power of
social institutions or bodies vis-a`-vis one another. These institutions or
bodies must, however, share some sense of relatedness (coupled with
commitment to a common purpose) inter se. There are variations on this
theme of relatedness. Among various organs of one and the same
institution or social sphere (the/a State, a church, a company), for
instance, the sense of relatedness will be relatively strong. The less rigidly
defined the realm within which interaction between institutions or bodies
as organs of society takes place, the weaker will their sense of relatedness
be, and beyond an appreciable overlap in the objectives that these organs
pursue (or meaningful points of tangency in the functions that they fulfil)
a sense of relatedness sufficient to sustain institutional subsidiarity will
hardly subsist. Furthermore, the devolution of responsibility (and power)
from more central (and more intensely empowered) levels (or spheres) of
governance to more local (and less intensely empowered) levels (or
spheres) is a typical concern of institutional subsidiarity. This form of
subsidiarity can thus not have effect in the absence of social institutions
or bodies or organs at different levels of centrality and with authority
varying in intensity or degree.
As a legal principle institutional subsidiarity is well established (and
readily relied on) in, amongst others, the law of the European Union and
in German constitutional law. In European law, for instance, it helps
determine whether an organ of the Union or rather an organ of a member
State should dispose of a matter,18 and it has, in this format and at the
behest of (among others) Germany (the German La¨nder in particular)19
and Britain, been incorporated into Article 3b of the Maastricht Treaty.
In German constitutional law20 institutional subsidiarity has informed
federalism decisively.21 Dawid van Wyk, the only South African
constitutional scholar to have published a piece of some substance on
16 As Benda, Maihofer & Vogel (eds) Handbuch des Verfassungsrechts 2 ed (1995) 1051 has it: ‘‘Nach
diesem Prinzip soll das, was die kleineren und untergeordneten Gemeinwesen leisten und zum guten
Ende fu¨hren ko¨nnen, nicht fu¨r die weitere und u¨bergeordnete Gemeinschaft in Anspruch genommen
werden.’’ [‘‘According to this principle a comprehensive, superordinate community ought not to take
for its account any matter that a smaller, subordinate community can deal with and bring to a good
end.’’]
17 Meyers Lexikon: Das Wissen A-Z; see also n 107 infra.
18 Cf the Maastricht Case (1993) 89 BverfGE 155. Art 23(1) of the German Constitution (dating from
1993) provides that Germany’s relationship with the European Union is based on subsidiarity.
19 Van Wyk Subsidiariteit 253.
20 Cf for a helpful and insightful overview Van Wyk Subsidiariteit 254-259.
21 Benda, Maihofer & Vogel (eds) Handbuch des Verfassungsrechts 1051-1052.
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subsidiarity,22 relies on comparative examples from German constitu-
tional law for an insightful exploration of the possible implications and
applications of instances of subsidiarity (deliberately and not so
deliberately) enshrined in South Africa’s 1993 and 1996 Constitutions.23
He refers appreciatively to subsidiarity as an implied (or implicit)
constitutional value24 ‘‘at the root of an open and democratic South
African society’’25 and shows convincingly that (and how) measured
reliance on subsidiarity (can) largely compensate for the dearth of eye-
catching federalist markers in South Africa’s constitutional text(s). The
instances of subsidiarity Van Wyk discusses mostly relate to the
relationship between the national, provincial and local spheres of
government, in other words, to federalism as an institutional concern,
but the determination of the powers and functioning of the various
spheres (or tiers)26 of government — and of the force and status of their
legislation vis-a`-vis one another — of course raises weighty strategic
issues of constitutional interpretation and adjudication too. It will be
unnecessary duplication, however, to revisit all the issues that Van Wyk
has dealt with. The discussion of institutional subsidiarity in this article
will therefore be limited to how — as forum- or court-specific
jurisdictional subsidiarity — it conditions the designation of authorised
adjudicative interpreters of the Constitution in specific instances.
4 Jurisdictional subsidiarity
Jurisdictional subsidiarity as an instance of institutional subsidiarity27 is
concerned with the apportionment of responsibility and power to
adjudicating fora. Its opposite number, instantiated by strategic
subsidiarity,28 is adjudicative subsidiarity which will be discussed more
fully under the next heading.
In German constitutional jurisprudence, considerations of institutional
subsidiarity are said to preclude the Bundesverfassungsgericht from
adjudicating matters with which other fora can deal.29 The South African
Constitutional Court has ruled to a similar effect holding in Amod v
Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accident Fund,30 for instance, that the
Supreme Court of Appeal was the more appropriate forum of higher
instance to develop the common law — in casu the common law of delict
regarding the claim of the dependent — in a manner contemplated in
22 As one of several essays on the (South African) Constitution in a volume presented to Marinus
Wiechers: cf Van Wyk Subsidiariteit.
23 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993 (‘‘the transitional Constitution’’)
and the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (‘‘the Constitution’’) respectively.
24 Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes (2002) 76.
25 A ‘‘waarde wat die oop en demokratiese Suid-Afrikaanse gemeenskap ten grondslag leˆ’’.
26 In the South African Constitution the term ‘‘spheres’’ is preferred to ‘‘tiers’’ (or ‘‘levels’’) as generic
appellation for national, provincial and local (areas of) government.
27 Cf par 3 supra.
28 Cf par 2 supra.
29 Hesse Grundzu¨ge des Verfassungsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 19 ed (1993) 143.
30 1998 10 BCLR (1998 4 SA 753) 1207 (CC).
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section 35(3) of the transitional Constitution (the predecessor to section
39(2) of the final Constitution).31 Here institutional subsidiarity informed
an answer to the jurisdictional question of which court should, for
adjudication purposes, be the authorised reader of the constitutional text
in that particular instance (and for the time being). The adjudicator-
reader thus designated must be in a position to dispose of the matter, but
does not have to do so as a forum of final instance. The fact that it may
be an authorised reader for the time being in the sense that (some of) its
findings may be subject to appeal, does not detract from — or reflect
adversely on — its authorisation as adjudicator-reader. Going on appeal
to a next (admittedly higher) forum is in the nature of adjudication, and
is at any rate dependent on leave to do so (only) where there is a prospect
that the next forum’s findings might deviate from those of the forum a
quo. Restraints on appeals, as a matter of fact, evidence jurisdictional-
subsidiarity-at-work, as does the declared dependence of courts of appeal
on a judgment (or judgments) a quo to maximise the quality of their own
adjudicative performance (even in instances where they deviate from such
adjudicative outcomes a quo). The Constitutional Court’s avowed
dependence on judgments a quo will be elaborated on below.
Since the Constitutional Court’s landmark judgment in Carmichele v
Minister of Safety and Security,32 which lays down guidelines for
strategies to develop the common law,33 the Amod judgment cannot be
understood to say that a forum like the Supreme Court of Appeal has a
more pivotal say in developing the common law than the Constitutional
Court itself has. The many instances in which development of the
common law by fora other than the Constitutional Court have been
induced by and have taken place to the unfaltering accompaniment of the
Carmichele judgment,34 bear testimony to the contrary. Furthermore, the
crucial question in the Amod case was not just how to apply the
31 These provisions enjoin any court developing the common law to ‘‘promote the spirit, purport and
objects of the Bill of Rights’’ cf eg s 39(2) of the 1996 Constitution.
32 2001 10 BCLR 995 (2001 4 SA 938) (CC).
33 It was held in this case that a court is always under an obligation to develop the common law and ‘‘this
duty upon judges arises in respect both of the civil and criminal law, whether or not the parties in any
particular case request the court to develop the common law under section 39(2) [of the Constitution]’’
(par 36). This obligation is not discretionary, but implicit in s 39(2) read with s 173 of the Constitution
(par 39). When a litigant contends that, in the light of the Constitution, the common law has to be
developed beyond existing precedent, a court is obliged to undertake a two-stage enquiry: ‘‘The first
stage is to consider whether the existing common law, having regard to the section 39(2) objectives,
requires development in accordance with these objectives. This inquiry requires a reconsideration of
the common law in the light of section 39(2). If this inquiry leads to a positive answer, the second stage
concerns itself with how such development is to take place in order to meet the section 39(2)
objectives’’ (par 40). Generally speaking, the Carmichele case states courts’ duty to develop the
common law in the light of constitutional values unambiguously and in an activist vein. This
reminisces (without explicitly citing) the constitutional injunction that the ‘‘state must respect, protect,
promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights’’ (verbalised in s 7(2) of the Constitution).
34 I shall not try and give a full list of cases where this happened just some examples: Brisley v Drotsky
2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) pars 2-3; Van Eeden v Minister of Safety and Security 2002 4 All SA 346 (SCA) par
8; Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden 2002 6 SA 431 (SCA) par 18; Du Plessis v Road
Accident Fund 2003 11 BCLR 120 (SCA) par 36.
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Constitution directly to (and in) the development of the common law.
The more critical question was whether it was at all possible (and
appropriate) to develop common law applicable to an occurrence
predating the commencement of the transitional Constitution in a
manner authorised (and indeed required) by that Constitution’s section
35(3). The Supreme Court of Appeal probably was the more appropriate
forum (first) to try and answer this particular question.
In the Carmichele case the Constitutional Court moreover did not end
up developing the common law itself. The case was referred back to fora
a quo with a very clear and compelling message about those courts’ duty
to develop the common law and, in the particular case, with clear
indications of the relevant constitutional dictates that had to be honoured
in doing so. This outcome is quite compatible with the exigencies of
jurisdictional subsidiarity, with the higher, more comprehensive judicial
authority providing lower, more localised doer-authorities with justifi-
catory ammunition empowering them to square up to the task of
developing the common law in a crucial area. The word ‘‘subsidiarity’’
was not on any of the Constitutional Court judges’ lips, though.
Jurisdictional subsidiarity could be trimmed down should the
Constitutional Court become South Africa’s apex court in all matters.35
However, it is hardly foreseeable that even as an apex court the
Constitutional Court, in deciding any issue (including a constitutional
issue) will part with its frequently declared dependence on judgments a
quo to maximise the quality of its own adjudicative performance. By
virtue of section 167(4) of the Constitution the Constitutional Court has
exclusive jurisdiction in a limited number of matters, but the Court itself
has made it clear that these instances are really exceptional, and the
default mindset of the Court is to attach considerable weight to the
benefits it can reap from the wisdom of a court or courts a quo:
‘‘It is . . . not ordinarily in the interests of justice for a court to sit as a court of first and last
instance, in which matters are decided without there being any possibility of appealing against
the decision given. Experience shows that decisions are more likely to be correct if more than
one court has been required to consider the issues raised. In such circumstances the losing party
has an opportunity of challenging the reasoning on which the first judgement is based, and of
reconsidering and refining arguments previously raised in the light of such judgement.’’36
The Constitutional Court moreover sometimes prefers to refrain from
ruling on the constitutionality of a statutory provision until such time as
experienced judges in other fora have had the opportunity to assess the
consequences of either retaining or striking down an impugned
provision.37
35 As is envisaged in the controversial Constitution Fourteenth Amendment Bill.
36 Bruce v Fleecytex Johannesburg CC 1998 4 BCLR 415 (1998 2 SA 1143) (CC) par 8. See also S v
Bequinot 1996 12 BCLR 1588 (1997 2 SA 887) (CC) par 15; Christian Education SA v Minister of
Education 1998 12 BCLR 1449 (1999 2 SA 83) (CC) pars 8 and 12; Dormehl v Minister of Justice 2000 5
BCLR 471 (2000 2 SA 987) (CC) par 5 and Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security supra pars 50-
53.
37 According to Kriegler J in S v Bequinot supra par 14.
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Section 167(4)(e) of the Constitution invests the Constitutional Court
with exclusive jurisdiction to decide whether parliament ‘‘has failed to
fulfil a constitutional obligation’’. The recent judgment of the Supreme
Court of Appeal in King v Attorneys Fidelity Fund Board of Control38
provides a good example of how inarticulate considerations of (jurisdic-
tional) subsidiarity can give rise to the narrowest possible reading of a
seemingly generous, exclusive jurisdictional authorisation. The question
in this case was whether allegedly insufficient public consultation in
passing an Act of parliament amounted to a breach of the National
Assembly’s constitutional obligation (imposed by section 59(1)(a) of the
Constitution) to ‘‘facilitate public involvement in the legislative and other
processes of the Assembly and its committees’’, thereby precluding all
courts other than the Constitutional Court from assessing parliament’s
allegedly flawed action and pronouncing on the validity of the Act
originating from such action. Notwithstanding the assumption that
provision for exclusive jurisdiction to the Constitutional Court is meant
‘‘to preserve the comity between the judicial branch of government . . .
and the legislative and executive branches . . . ensuring that only the
highest court in constitutional matters intrudes into the domain of the
principal legislative and executive organs of State’’,39 the Supreme Court
of Appeal (per Cameron and Nugent JJA) opted for a narrow reading of
section 167(4)(e), especially vis-a`-vis section 172(2)(a) which authorises
the Supreme Court of Appeal and High Courts to make an order
concerning the constitutional validity of legislation in all spheres of
government and of conduct of the president (subject to confirmation by
the Constitutional Court).40
Adjudication of the constitutionality of legislation, the Supreme Court
of Appeal thought, may inevitably involve an assessment of a law-
maker’s legislative action and section 167(4)(e) certainly does not
preclude the Supreme Court of Appeal (or a High Court) from finding
that the National Assembly, for instance, adopted legislative provisions
falling outside the scope of its legislative authority as defined by the
Constitution (and most notably by the Bill of Rights), and that the
Assembly in this sense ‘‘breached a constitutional obligation’’.41 The
same applies should parliament fail to enact a statute ‘‘properly at all’’
negating requirements of ‘‘manner and form’’. It is contentious, however,
whether procedural prerequisites to the validity of legislation (invariably)
impose ‘‘a constitutional obligation’’ as envisaged in section 167(4)(e).42
It is furthermore conceivable, according to the Court, that parliament
may renounce its constitutional obligations to such an extent that it
38 2006 4 BCLR 462 (SCA) pars 13-14.
39 President of the Republic of South Africa v SARFU 1999 2 BCLR 175 (1999 2 SA 14) (CC) par 29.
40 King v Attorneys Fidelity Fund Board of Control supra pars 13-14.
41 Par 16.
42 Pars 17-18.
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ceases to be (or to act as) the body which the Constitution calls
‘‘parliament’’. Parliament could, for instance, thus renounce its constitu-
tional obligation to act accountably, responsively and openly by
convening in secret or at an undisclosed venue.43 In such an event
parliament will not be enacting legislation and it will be competent for a
court other than the Constitutional Court to make such a finding. Well
short of this extreme, however, parliament is left with considerable
leeway to decide how to fulfil its constitutional obligations and it is (only)
the judicial assessment of the ‘‘quality’’ or adequacy of such fulfilment
which falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Constitutional
Court.44 In casu the complaint was that an Act was passed not without
any public consultation at all, but without enough public consultation.
This is a matter that falls to be decided exclusively by the Constitutional
Court.
Though it has remained unspecified in the constitutional case law,
jurisdictional subsidiarity is undeniably — but not rigidly or dogmatically
— invoked to designate and empower authorised readers of the
Constitution (and other texts relevant for constitutional interpretation
and adjudication) and to delineate the authority of these readers.
Jurisdictional subsidiarity has contributed considerably to making
constitutional adjudication a sensible team effort and has contributed a
great deal to the empowerment of a judiciary (and a legal community in
general) for whom reading and applying a supreme Constitution came as
a novelty (only) a little more than a decade ago.
5 Adjudicative subsidiarity
Adjudicative subsidiarity as an instance of strategic subsidiarity45 guides
the adjudication of substantive issues of law. It is this version of
subsidiarity that has informed the dictum in the Mhlungu case46 (which
was cited right at the beginning of this article). As explained above,
jurisdictional subsidiarity assigns adjudicative responsibility to an
appropriate forum, thereby evincing, in constitutional interpretation
and adjudication, the broader principle of subsidiarity in its institutional
signification. Adjudicative subsidiarity, on the other hand, is ‘‘mode-’’ or
‘‘issue-centric’’: it enjoins one and the same forum to prefer an
aconstitutional (or, at least, an indirectly constitutional) to a strictly
constitutional mode of adjudication whenever the solution of a legal
question admits of the former (and does not of necessity require the
latter). The highest authority of the Constitution is, in other words, not to
be overused to decide issues that can be disposed of with reliance on
specific, subordinate and non-constitutional precepts of law.
43 Pars 20-23.
44 Pars 20-23.
45 Cf 2 supra.
46 S v Mhlungu supra.
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In Zantsi v Council of State, Ciskei,47 Chaskalson P explained (without
using the terminology) that adjudicative subsidiarity as just described can
allow the law to develop incrementally, and this is desirable in view of the
far-reaching implications attaching to constitutional decisions. Adjudi-
cative subsidiarity moreover discourages court rulings ‘‘in the abstract on
issues which are not the subject of controversy and are only of academic
interest’’48 and also contributes to an appropriate demarcation of the
respective spheres of authority of the legislature and the judiciary.49
Constitutional over-adjudication, especially in reviewing legislation,
could deprive the legislature of the opportunity to deal with an issue of
its own accord, in its own distinctive manner and in response to its
mandate from the electorate. The legislature and the executive are often
better equipped than the courts are to gauge and respond to the needs of
society. In addition they are democratically accountable. From these
observations it appears that there is also a connection between
adjudicative subsidiarity and the doctrine of separation of powers (or
trias politica). This connection will be looked at more closely under the
next heading.
Bland and unthoughtful (over-)reliance on adjudicative subsidiarity
could enervate the precedence of the Constitution as supreme law. The
Constitutional Court has thus, on occasion, found it necessary to contain
reliance on this form of subsidiarity. In the Zantsi case,50 Chaskalson P,
for instance, observed that the Constitutional Court will constitutionalise
an issue whenever it is necessary to dispose of a matter on appeal. He
added that adjudicative subsidiarity cannot stand in the way of ‘‘the
interest of justice’’. In Harksen v Lane NO51 Goldstone J also made it
clear that there is no ‘‘hard and fast rule to the effect that in no case
should referrals be made to this Court where non-constitutional remedies
have not been exhausted’’.
Adjudicative subsidiarity can at any rate not justify interpretive and/or
adjudicative preference for a non- (or not strictly) constitutional option
inconsistent with the Constitution. Where there are several options
(equally) consistent with the Constitution, adjudicative subsidiarity can,
at best, prompt preference for the option most consistent with the non-
constitutional law as it stands.
In The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA In Re: The Ex
Parte Application of the President of the RSA,52 the Constitutional Court
rejected the conclusion of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Commissioner
of Customs and Excise v Container Logistics (Pty) Ltd; Commissioner of
47 1995 10 BCLR 1424 (1995 4 SA 615) (CC) par 5.
48 Par 7.
49 Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 5 ed (2005) 75-78.
50 Zantsi v Council of State, Ciskei supra par 4.
51 1997 11 1489 (1998 1 SA 300) (CC) par 26.
52 2000 3 BCLR 241 (2000 2 SA 674) (CC).
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Customs and Excise v Rennie Group Ltd trading as Renfreight,53 that the
review of administrative action has to a large extent remained a
procedure determined primarily by common law. Chaskalson P, in no
uncertain terms, affirmed the supremacy of the Constitution where and
whenever the exercise of any form of public power becomes susceptible to
judicial assessment:54
‘‘The control of public power by the courts through judicial review is and always has been a
constitutional matter . . . The common law principles that previously provided the grounds for
judicial review of public power have been subsumed under the Constitution, and in so far as
they might continue to be relevant to judicial review, they gain their force from the
Constitution. In the judicial review of public power, the two are intertwined and do not
constitute separate concepts.’’55
The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers case56 was the Constitutional
Court’s response to a tendency of the Supreme Court of Appeal (at the
time) to pretend that constitution-related issues can be disposed of in an
‘‘enlightened’’, rights-friendly manner without reference to (let alone
reliance on) the Constitution. In this way the South African common law
on defamation was liberalised, for example, by extending the protection
of free speech. This was done in a judgment (to wit National Media Ltd v
Bogoshi)57 professing not to draw on constitutional resources. The law of
evidence relating to sexual offences was also modernised (in S v
Jackson)58 by abolishing the so-called cautionary rule of evidence in
rape cases without mentioning the word ‘‘Constitution’’ even in passing.
On the one hand, such a tendency may be seen as an outcome of
profitable reliance on adjudicative subsidiarity, giving effect to a
preference of the Constitutional Court itself (that is, the preference
verbalised in the Mhlungu dictum). On the other hand, it raises the
question whether the Constitution was meant simply to function as a
silent background norm whenever the common law stands to be
‘‘liberalised’’. The Supreme Court of Appeal’s seemingly enlightened
judgments on free speech and the cautionary rule in sexual offences
would most probably not have been handed down had it not been for (the
existence of) the Constitution with its Bill of Rights. Does it become any
court to allow itself to be influenced by the Constitution and then not
acknowledge it? The Constitutional Court in the Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers case59 suggested that it does not — at least not when
the exercise of public power enters into the picture.
53 1999 8 BCLR 833 (1999 3 SA 771) (SCA).
54 Cf eg pars 17, 20, 27, 33, 44 and 45.
55 Par 33.
56 The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA In Re: The Ex Parte Application of the President
of the RSA supra.
57 1998 4 SA 1196 (SCA).
58 1998 1 SACR 470 (SCA).
59 The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA In Re: The Ex Parte Application of the President
of the RSA supra.
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A court, with prudent reliance on ‘‘non-constitutional’’ law, can often
resolve an issue in a manner very much consistent with — and indeed
conducive to — constitutional values (and the spirit, purport and objects
of the Bill of Rights), without necessarily ‘‘reaching a constitutional
issue’’.60 A case in which the Supreme Court of Appeal could have done
this, but unfortunately did not do it, was Afrox Health Care Bpk v
Strydom.61 To conclude this discussion of adjudicative subsidiarity, this
case will next be considered critically, and will then briefly be contrasted
with the case of Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern
Cape v Ngxuza62 in which the same Court prudently developed the
common law in response to a constitutional exigency, and yet refrained
from out and out constitutionalising the issue under consideration.
5 1 Afrox Health Care Bpk v Strydom
In this case the question was whether, Strydom, the respondent, was
bound by an exemption clause in a written (standard) contract that he
had concluded with a private hospital group (the appellant) upon his
admission to one of its hospitals. The clause indemnified the appellant
against any claim for damages or injury a patient (in casu the respondent)
might suffer as a result (even) of the negligence of any hospital in the
group and/or its personnel. The Supreme Court of Appeal thought that
this was a case where optimum effect (and recognition) had to be given to
both the appellant’s and the respondent’s freedom of contract,63 since this
form of freedom is commensurate with (and indeed an incarnation of) the
prominence which freedom and human dignity enjoy as guiding values in
the (South African) Constitution.64 A court should, accordingly, be slow
to interfere with terms of agreements which free-willing parties had
entered into consciously, and this includes a mutually agreed on
exemption clause which in casu (and in effect) excused the appellant
from (and thus indemnified it against) all negligence short of gross
negligence on its part.
The respondent argued (inter alia) that the questionable exemption
clause infringed his section 27(1)(a) constitutional right of access to
health care services65 and was therefore not enforceable. Reliance on this
particular right was, in the circumstances, ill-conceived. Uncertainty
surrounds the enforcement of constitutionally entrenched, socio-economic
entitlements against private persons or institutions, and the 1996
Constitution, in which the section 27(1)(a) right occurred for the first
time, was at any rate not in force yet when the respondent’s contract with
60 S v Mhlungu supra par 59.
61 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA).
62 2001 4 SA 1184 (SCA).
63 Par 8.
64 Pars 22-23; and cf ss 1(a), 7(1), 36(1) and 39(1)(a) of the Constitution. Human dignity is also the
substance of an entrenched right; cf s 10 of the Constitution.
65 Pars 15-16 and 19-20.
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the appellant was concluded on 15 August 1995.66 The obvious
constitutional right at stake in this case was rather Strydom’s right to
the security of his person entrenched in section 11(1) of the transitional
Constitution67 (and this escaped the attention of both of the parties and
of the Court). In contracting with the appellant the respondent, typically
like a patient who is being admitted to hospital, put his physical (and
psychological) well-being in the hands of the appellant (and its personnel)
because he needed specialist care (else he could just as well have opted for
home-nursing). It is hard to see that (and how) — with a constitutionally
guaranteed right to security of the person in place, and with the common
law of contract on exemption clauses construed with due regard to the
spirit, purport and objects of the 1993 Bill of Rights68 — a hospital could
successfully rely on a contractual exemption clause excusing its negligent
non-performance of exactly that which its patient sought to procure by
entering into the contract with it, namely diligent and expert care for the
security of his person jeopardised by illness.
Tjakie Naude´ and Gerhard Lubbe convincingly show that it (also)
follows from sound and solid law-of-contract reasoning that it should not
be possible to conclude a contract which, via an exemption clause,
negates its own essence.69 The authors come to this conclusion not just by
looking at contemporary trends in the law of contract, but also with
reliance on historical material going as far back as the ancient Greek
philosopher, Aristotle. Adjudicative subsidiarity would designate an
argumentative strategy like that of Naude´ & Lubbe as the most
appropriate in a case like Afrox. But this does not mean that the
Constitution and constitutional values exit the picture. The conclusions
of Naude´ & Lubbe also happen to be most in conformity with the
‘‘constitutional conclusion’’ that the exemption clause in the hospital’s
standard contract is inconsistent with the protection afforded (and the
value attached) to Strydom’s constitutional right to security of his
person. For a court to mention this in support of a finding that the
exemption clause should not be enforced, would not be tantamount to
‘‘reaching a constitutional issue’’.70 It would rather be a judicial
intimation (and a recognition of the fact) that the law of contract can,
in this particular case very much on its own terms, be developed to
promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.71 ‘‘Reaching
66 The transitional Constitution of 1993 that was in force at the time did not contain any provisions
similar to ss 26 and 27 of the 1996 Constitution guaranteeing a right of access to a number of
commodities.
67 Presently enshrined in s 12(1) of the 1996 Constitution. Had the latter Constitution been applicable to
this case, Strydom’s s 12(2) right to bodily and psychological integrity would probably also have been
on the line.
68 As was required by s 35(3) of the transitional Constitution.
69 Naude´ & Lubbe ‘‘Exemption Clauses a Rethink Occasioned by Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom’’
2005 SALJ 441 especially 445-453.
70 Per Kentridge AJ in S v Mhlungu supra par 59.
71 In accordance with the requirements of s 39(2) of the Constitution.
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a constitutional issue’’ in the Afrox case would have meant deciding the
issue on the basis of how section 11(1) of the transitional Constitution
can best be construed to cater for the Afrox type situation (which would
have involved a directly horizontal enforcement of the constitutional
right entrenched in the section).72 However, the latter approach runs the
risk of impeding the development of the law of contract on exemption
clauses as law of contract (subject, at any rate, to — and disciplined by —
the Constitution and the Bill of Rights).
In the actual judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal handed down
in the Afrox case, the most unfavourable of all possibilities for the
development of the common law and for the realisation of constitu-
tionally entrenched fundamental rights and values in (and through) the
(common) law of contract, prevailed. The Supreme Court of Appeal put
its faith in a version of the law of contract that was formalistic in the
extreme, outdated and, to crown it all, historically suspect (as Naude´ &
Lubbe point out). The court’s triumphant identification of human dignity
and freedom (manifested in freedom of contract) as the key constitutional
values to be honoured, was rather bland, artificial — and uninformed
with any sense of reality. If contractual freedom indeed is an instance of
freedom-with-dignity then most certainly it cannot be just an unfettered,
libertarian, free-for-all type of freedom. It is hard to see how the law of
contract pertaining to exemption clauses can be construed (and left
undeveloped) to allow a ‘‘stronger’’ contracting party to enforce, against
a ‘‘weaker’’ party, a contractual exemption which, to no insignificant
degree, undoes the essence of that to which the parties have ostensibly
committed themselves reciprocally, namely the procurement of the
‘‘weaker’’ party’s security of the person in circumstances where he is in
need of specialist, physical care. The failure of the parties and of the court
in the Afrox case to identify the actual constitutional right(s) (and values)
at stake, ensured that as an example of what adjudicative subsidiarity can
work for constitutionally sensitive and sensible adjudication, Afrox
would remain a non-starter.
As was intimated before, ‘‘reaching a constitutional issue’’ in the Afrox
situation would have involved a directly horizontal application of section
11(1) of the transitional Constitution (against a private hospital as
caretaker-at-fault). This reminisces the Constitutional Court’s once
landmark (and now almost forgotten) judgment of Du Plessis v De
Klerk73 in which it was held that section 7(1) and (2) of the transitional
Constitution had to be understood restrictively so as to exclude a directly
(as opposed to an indirectly) horizontal operation of its Bill of Rights.
However, section 8(1)-(3) (and especially 8(2) and 8(3)) of the 1996
Constitution, the successor to section 7(1) and (2), does seem to allow for
72 See the discussion infra.
73 1996 5 BCLR 659 (1996 3 SA 850) (CC).
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a directly horizontal application of the Bill of Rights. Section 8(2), for
instance, stipulates that ‘‘[a] provision of the Bill of Rights binds a
natural or a juristic person if, and to the extent that, it is applicable,
taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty
imposed by the right’’. There has not been a Du Plessis v De Klerk on
section 8 (yet),74 but in Khumalo v Holomisa,75 O’Regan J intimated that
direct horizontal application of the Bill of Rights (to natural and juristic
persons) is always a distinct possibility, depending on the circumstances
of each particular case. Section 8(3) of the Constitution, however,
requires (or, at least, prefers) any directly horizontal application of a
right in the Bill of Rights to be mediated by the common law, especially
in the absence of legislation giving effect to such a right. ‘‘Common law’’
can be the common law as it stands or the common law as developed by
the court (should the law as it stands fail to cater for the exigencies of a
particular case in a manner promoting the spirit, purport and objects of
the Bill of Rights). Section 8(3) thus leaves ample room (and indeed
encourages and creates opportunities) for adjudicative subsidiarity as
understood in Mhlungu and as explained in the discussion up to now.
5 2 The Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape v
Ngxuza76
Section 38(c) of the Constitution confers standing in constitutional
(and, in particular, in Bill of Rights) litigation on ‘‘anyone acting as a
member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of persons’’. Section
7(b)(iv) of the transitional Constitution first anticipated (and authorised)
the use of class actions in constitutional litigation in the same explicit
terms as section 38(c) of the Constitution presently does, thereby creating
a need for the development of the existing common law of civil procedure
in respect of a traditionally underutilised mode of litigation in the South
African context.77 The case of Ngxuza v Permanent Secretary, Depart-
ment of Welfare, Eastern Cape78 provided, first, the Eastern Cape
Division of the High Court and subsequently, on appeal, the Supreme
Court of Appeal79 with an opportunity to break fresh ground in this
regard.
One of the questions that had to be answered in this case was whether
(potential) litigants, identifiable as members of a class but residing
74 The way in which s 8 of the 1996 Constitution has been structured, arguably precludes the necessity of
an effort as monumental as Du Plessis v De Klerk supra to unravel the mystery of (direct) horizontal
application.
75 2002 8 BCLR 771 (2002 5 SA 401) (CC) pars 31-34.
76 Supra.
77 Cameron JA refers to class actions as envisaged in the Constitution as ‘‘an innovation expressly
mandated by the Constitution’’ Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape v
Ngxuza supra par 22.
78 Ngxuza v Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape supra.
79 Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape v Ngxuza supra.
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outside of the area of jurisdiction of the Eastern Cape High Court, could
(in the said court) be recognised as members of a class of plaintiffs
bringing an action against the Eastern Cape Department of Welfare
consequent upon withholding their disability grants unlawfully. The
manner in which both courts dealt with this specific question,
significantly illustrates proper and prudent reliance on adjudicative
subsidiarity. Froneman J verbalised the court a quo’s position as follows:
‘‘Even if the members of the class residing outside the area of jurisdiction of this Court but
elsewhere in South Africa are not parties to the action in the strict sense of the word as used in s
19(1)(b) of the Supreme Court Act, they may still be regarded as members of the class in the
action in this Court . . . The ratio jurisdictionis connecting them to the case is the class action
itself. If this amounts to a development of the common law, I am of the view that such a
development is justified and permissible by virtue of ss 172(1) and 173 of the Constitution. In
Estate Agents Board v Lek 1979 (3) SA 1048 (A) at 1063F it was stated that the question
whether a court has jurisdiction ‘depends on (a) the nature of the proceedings, (b) the nature of
the relief claimed therein, or (c) in some cases, both (a) and (b)’. Having regard to these factors
it is perhaps not even necessary to call ss 172(1) and 173 of the Constitution in aid (compare
also s 19(1)(a)(iii) of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959).’’80
From this dictum appears, first, the court’s deference to a constitu-
tional exigency, namely to develop the (existing) law regarding class
actions for purposes of constitutional litigation, and, secondly, resort to
(a strategy of) adjudicative subsidiarity, searching the existing case law
(and not the constitutional text) with a fine comb for a point of contact or
catalyst to get the constitutionally required development going. This
leads the court to the conclusion that it may perhaps not even be
‘‘necessary to call . . . the Constitution in aid’’ to effect the actual
development. The Constitution as catalyst or agent for the development
of the existing law is therefore not necessarily also the source for it.
In the judgment on appeal a similar modus operandi was followed, with
Cameron JA holding that:
‘‘We are enjoined by the Constitution to interpret the Bill of Rights, including its standing
provisions, so as to ‘promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on
human dignity, equality and freedom’. As pointed out earlier we are also enjoined to develop
the common law which includes the common law of jurisdiction so as to ‘promote the
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights’. This Court has in the past not been averse to
developing the doctrines and principles of jurisdiction so as to ensure rational and equitable
rules. In Roberts Construction Co Ltd v Willcox Bros (Pty) Ltd81 this Court held, applying the
common-law doctrine of cohesion of a cause of action (continentia causae), that where one
court has jurisdiction over a part of a cause, considerations of convenience, justice and good
sense justify its exercising jurisdiction over the whole cause. The partial location of the object
of a contractual performance (a bridge between two provinces) within the jurisdiction of one
court therefore gave that court jurisdiction over the whole cause of action. The Court expressly
left open the further development and application of the doctrine of cohesion of causes. The
present seems to me a matter amply justifying its further evolution. The Eastern Cape Division
has jurisdiction over the original applicants and over members of the class entitled to payment
80 Ngxuza v Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape supra 628G-629H.
81 1962 4 SA 326 (A).
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of their pensions within its domain. That, in my view, is sufficient to give it jurisdiction over the
whole class, who, subject to satisfactory ‘opt-out’ procedures, will accordingly be bound by its
judgment.’’82
Once again a constitutional injunction inspired development of the
existing (common) law on class actions, but continentia causae, a
recognised legal notion from within the existing law, infused it. This
was adjudicative subsidiarity-in-action, no doubt.
6 Adjudicative subsidiarity, constitutional supremacy and judicial
restraint
Adjudicative subsidiarity presupposes a nuanced, non-absolutist
understanding of constitutional supremacy. It will therefore be helpful
to consider, first, why it can be said that the Constitution is supreme
(law); secondly, how the practice of judicial self-restraint (induced by
considerations of trias politica) help illustrate that constitutional
supremacy is not tantamount to constitutional absolutism; and then,
finally, to consider the implications of the foregoing for adjudicative
subsidiarity.
The constitutional text itself proclaims (and articulates) the Constitu-
tion’s supremacy. In section 2 it is stated that:
‘‘This Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is
invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled.’’
This contention is affirmed by section 8(1)’s statement that the Bill of
Rights (chapter 2 of the supreme Constitution) is (highest law) applicable
to all law, in other words, to statute, common (including case) and
customary law, and that it binds the legislature, the executive, the
judiciary and all organs of State. These assertions of constitutional
supremacy are backed by operational stipulations providing for the
justiciability of the Constitution:
. Court orders are binding on all organs of State.83
. The Constitution vouches for the independence of the judiciary,84 and
provides for the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court,85 the
Supreme Court of Appeal86 and High Courts87 in, amongst others,
constitutional matters which are said to involve ‘‘the interpretation,
protection or enforcement of the Constitution’’ (own italics).88
82 Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape v Ngxuza supra par 22.
83 S 165(5).
84 S 165(2) and (3).
85 S 167(3)-(7).
86 S 168(3) albeit by implication. The subsection refers to the SCA’s jurisdiction in constitutional matters
in a manner implying that this Court has such jurisdiction: it ‘‘is the highest court of appeal except in
constitutional matters’’ (my italics).
87 S 169(a) explicitly refers to these courts’ jurisdiction in constitutional matters.
88 S 167(7).
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. Section 172 details the powers of the courts aforesaid in constitutional
matters. Of considerable significance for upholding constitutional
supremacy is these courts’ constitutional duty (‘‘a court must . . .’’) to
‘‘declare that any law or conduct inconsistent with the Constitution is
invalid to the extent of its inconsistency’’.89
Making themselves felt side by side with the direct and auxiliary
affirmations of constitutional supremacy above-said, are indicia in the
constitutional text that constitutional review is to be exercised with
restraint, especially when, in relation to statute law, a court exercises its
testing right. Thus the selfsame section 172(1) of the Constitution
requiring and, indeed, instructing a court with jurisdiction in constitu-
tional matters to declare law or conduct inconsistent with the
Constitution invalid, also provides for means to restrain the effects of a
declaration of invalidity: a court may make any order that is just and
equitable, including an order limiting the retrospective effect of a
declaration of invalidity, or the court may suspend such a declaration for
any period and on any conditions so as to afford a competent authority
the opportunity to correct the defect.90 Conventionally considerations of
separation of powers (trias politica),91 rather than subsidiarity, have
informed the idea and practice of judicial self-restraint implicit in these
constitutional provisions. Judicial review of legislation raises the spectre
of counter-majoritarianism (or ‘‘the counter-majoritarian difficulty’’ as it
is also known). The competence of unelected judges to assess the
constitutional tenability of laws made by democratically elected,
deliberative legislatures and then to strike down whatever (in their view)
is inconsistent with the Constitution, suspectedly (but not always and
inevitably) runs counter to the horizontal differentiation of legislative,
executive and judicial authority in a modern-day, democratic State92 —
hence the clarion call to the judiciary for self-restraint.
Though they share the potential to contribute to a de-absolutisation of
the Constitution’s power, there are elemental differences between trias
politica and subsidiarity, best illustrated when trias politica and
institutional subsidiarity are compared. Institutional subsidiarity, as
pointed out before, is possible only among institutions or bodies
. sharing a sense of relatedness (coupled with commitment to a common
purpose) inter se,
89 S 172(1)(a); Mkangeli v Joubert 2001 4 BCLR 316 (2001 2 SA 1191) (CC) par 10.
90 S 172(1)(b).
91 Leading case law authorities on trias politica are Bernstein v Bester NNO 1996 2 SA 751 (1996 4 BCLR
449) (CC) par 105; De Lange v Smuts NO 1998 3 SA 785 (1998 7 BCLR 779) (CC), and SA Association
of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath 2001 1 BCLR 77 (CC) par 22.
92 Tushnet ‘‘Anti-formalism in Recent Constitutional Theory’’ 1985 (83) Michigan Law Review 1502
1503; Davis, Chaskalson & De Waal Democracy and Constitutionalism: The Role of Constitutional
Interpretation in Van Wyk, Dugard, De Villiers & Davis (eds) Rights and Constitutionalism: The New
South African Legal Order (1994) 1 6-19 and Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 22.
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. with an appreciable overlap in their objectives (or meaningful points of
tangency in the functions they fulfil), and
. in respect of which there is a possibility for the devolution of
responsibility (and power) from more central (and more intensely
empowered) levels (or spheres) of governance to more local (and less
intensely empowered) levels (or spheres).
Trias politica’s concern is with three distinct types (or modes) of State
authority,93 distinguishable not because they fulfil similar functions at
different levels of centrality (with variations in their intensity or degree of
authority), but because, as equals-in-principle, their purposes and
functions are intrinsically dissimilar. The three types of authority, each
on its turf, (can) function in accordance with the exigencies of
institutional subsidiarity — hence central and less central (and more
and less powerful) legislatures, administrative organs and courts. The
well-being of the State is seen to depend on each type of State authority
performing its own typical functions, with due respect for the typicalness
(and the province) of — but not exerting itself in isolation from — the
others. Ideally these three types of State authority should restrict — or
‘‘check and balance’’ — one another.
Judicial self-restraint instantiates courts’ deference to the typicalness
(and their non-intrusion into in the province of) legislatures and
administrative organs of State, and it implies (and indeed requires) a
constitutional reading strategy which, in its turn, commences with a
realistic appraisal of what a supreme Constitution is. It is imperative that
especially the judiciary, the branch of government most explicitly and
most powerfully authorised to construe the Constitution and uphold it
vis-a`-vis the other two branches,94 will be heedful not to (over-)use the
Constitution’s supreme authority to thwart the crucial balance of power
between itself, the legislature and the executive.
A supreme Constitution is the nation’s solemn and consequential
memorandum of agreement. It is also just a document, however: a written
law-text amongst others or ‘‘a linguistic datum’’.95 The 1996 Constitution
is the supreme law of the Republic of South Africa, but it is not an
overarching, all-encompassing, super law.96 As a text authored by a
demonstrable constitution-maker it is, like any statute authored by a
demonstrable law-maker, a normative law-text, existing side by side with
other normative law-texts (such as norms of the common law or of
customary law) which are not attributable to the authorship of
93 Sometimes also referred to as ‘‘branches of government’’.
94 That much appeared from the consideration of the provisions of s 172(1) supra.
95 In the words of Mu¨ller ‘‘Basic Questions of Constitutional Concretisation’’ 1999 Stell LR 269.
96 Du Plessis ‘‘The Status of Legislation and the Realisation of Constitutional Values in the New
Constitutional Dispensation’’ 2000 Stell LR 192 201 and Re-Interpretation 28.
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immediately demonstrable makers.97 The Constitution enjoys precedence
among normative law-texts without, however, totally overpowering or
simply defeating them, and it certainly is not meant to substitute them in
every conceivable situation. It is on this score that opportunities for
constructive reliance on adjudicative subsidiarity to de-absolutise the
power of the Constitution, open up. This is best understood when an
analogy is drawn between institutional subsidiarity (as it was explained
above in order to distinguish it from trias politica) and adjudicative
subsidiarity when it is relied on in quest of avoiding an over-
constitutionalisation of issues (as envisaged in the Mhlungu case98).
Co-existing constitutional and non-constitutional norms may share a
sense of relatedness (coupled with the pursuit of a common purpose) inter
se, and there may be an overlap in their objectives (or points of tangency
in the functions they fulfil) sufficiently appreciable to make them
‘‘compete’’ for application in a specific situation. In such a situation the
exigencies of adjudicative subsidiarity put forward the non-constitutional
norm as the stronger contender for application. However, it must be
possible to devolve authority to the non-constitutional norm, meaning
that this norm must not contradict or be otherwise inconsistent with the
constitutional norm, for if this happens, the supreme authority of the
constitutional norm demands its prevalence, but this still will not obviate
or terminate the effect of adjudicative subsidiarity without more ado. If it
is at all possible to effect the peaceful coexistence of the constitutional
and the non-constitutional norm by, for instance, reading down the
latter99 or developing it,100 this state of affairs is preferable to simply
striking it down. True, there is a hierarchy of norms in this situation, with
the constitutional norm at the apex, but it is not a hierarchy of more and
less comprehensive or encompassing norms (with the constitutional norm
‘‘speaking on behalf of’’ the non-constitutional norm): it is a hierarchy of
trumps — a phenomenon not unfamiliar to statute law. If (subordinate)
delegated legislation is pitched against the (higher or superordinate)
original legislation authorising it, the latter will trump the former (only)
in so far as they cannot co-exist or be reconciled. Since 27 April 1994 a
supreme Constitution has found itself at the apex of a hierarchy not only
of laws enacted by legislatures, but also of common and customary law
norms, and as is the case with delegated vis-a`-vis original legislation, it is
not readily assumed that the ‘‘higher law’’ invariably has to undo and
take the place of the ‘‘lower law’’.
97 Wille Principles of South African Law 8 ed (1991) 1 verbalises this notion as follows: ‘‘Laws in the wide
sense are simply rules of action. In this sense a law is a statement of what invariably recurs time after
time in certain given conditions or circumstances.’’
98 S v Mhlungu supra par 59.
99 This procedure of ‘‘reading down’’ is sometimes also referred to as ‘‘interpretation in conformity with
the constitution’’ (Verfassungskonforme Auslegung) Du Plessis Re-Interpretation 140-143.
100 In accordance with ss 8(3) and 39(2) of the Constitution.
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It is beyond dispute that constitutional and non-constitutional norms
share one overriding, overarching (highest) objective, namely to optimise
the effect of constitutional values and lend the best possible protection to
fundamental rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights. If a non-
constitutional norm or norms can achieve this objective quite hand-
somely, direct reliance on such a norm or norms in constitutional
construction and adjudication is wholly appropriate, for that would help
to locate constitutional values and rights right where they belong, namely
at the very grassroots of concretising and applying ‘‘ordinary’’ law. These
values and rights are more actively and enduringly honoured in this way,
than by attempts to subsume, as a matter of course, every single case of
constitutional adjudication under constitutional norms couched in
expansive and open-ended phraseology.
What, under the present heading, has been described so far is a
subsidiarity induced preference for not ‘‘reaching a constitutional
issue’’101 — it is not an attempt to deny or eliminate constitutional
issues altogether or to ignore the Constitution whenever possible. As was
pointed out in the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers case,102 there are
certain issues, for instance the exercise of public power, which are
inevitably (and only) constitutional issues,103 and whose resolution
depends on a proper construction of the constitutional text as prime
source of constitutional law. Besides, even when the Constitution
functions as a trump in a situation where non-constitutional law is
invoked to deal with a matter, it is still impossible to ignore the former as
supreme law: it is in the nature of a trump as trump to maintain a
scouting ubiquity.
7 Evaluative perspectives — in conclusion
Subsidiarity (and, in particular, adjudicative subsidiarity) need not
enervate or undermine the authority of the supreme Constitution —
though there is no guarantee that it could not (and never will). However,
to avoid reliance on (adjudicative) subsidiarity just because of this
possibility (or ‘‘danger’’) would be to throw the baby out with the
bathwater. Subsidiarity has the beneficial and wholesome potential to
steer the development of non-constitutional law in a direction where the
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights (and of the Constitution
as a whole) are promoted in life’s concrete situations, at the grassroots, as
it were, where answers to legal questions are most urgently called for. It is
worthwhile to live with such a ‘‘danger’’. An analogy may help explain
why this is so.
101 Cf S v Mhlungu supra par 59.
102 The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA In Re: The Ex Parte Application of the President
of the RSA supra.
103 Supra par 33.
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Henk Botha, writing about the counter-majoritarian difficulty,
concludes that there is no point in trying to resolve this intricacy and
that living with it instead may be wholesome, because the tensions it
generates could be creative (rather than destructive) in sculpting a
constitutional order.104 These tensions may, for instance, help to keep an
institutionally mediated dialogue between the legislature and the
judiciary alive.105 Likewise, the tension between a possible invigoration
and enervation of the Constitution, attendant on (adjudicative)
subsidiarity, could also result in a creative prevalence over both
constitutional minimalism and totalitarianism, trumping ‘‘an easy way
out’’ essentialism with its propensity to oversimplify solutions for
complex issues.
Van Wyk points out that subsidiarity can also pertain to the
relationship between the State and the individual (as well as other
bearers of fundamental rights) and he sees the strong emphasis in South
Africa’s two supreme Constitutions since 1994 on freedom and equality
(and, in time, also on human dignity) as a wholesome consequence of
subsidiarity.106 The view that subsidiarity can contribute to giving a
certain content and meaning to the relationship between the State and the
individual (as well as the State and free associations of individuals) finds
support in some more philosophical depictions of subsidiarity too.107
According to this view, subsidiarity is not just about leaving individuals
(and their associations) to themselves to do as they please, but also to
empower them to be free to act, and through their action, to promote the
common good.
This once again raises a question previously posed in passing (and not
answered yet):108 Is subsidiarity as ‘‘the quality of being subsidiary’’109
attributable primarily to subsidiary (and subordinate) or rather to
comprehensive (and superordinate) institutions/norms? This question can
be teased out as follows: If subsidiarity is about preference for (less
comprehensive, subordinate) subsidiaries either as (institutional) doers or
as (strategic) norms for doing, does the term ‘‘subsidiarity’’ (i) refer to the
preference for these subsidiaries as such or (ii) does it, given this
preference, verbalise comprehensive (and superordinate) authorities’
104 Botha ‘‘Democracy and Rights: Constitutional Interpretation in a Postrealist World’’ 2000 THRHR
561 578-581.
105 De Ville Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation (2000) 20-26.
106 Van Wyk Subsidiariteit 258-260.
107 Audi (ed) The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 2 ed (1999) 886-887 and the PC Bibliothek. Meyers
Lexikon: Politik und Gesellschaft (1993) which defines ‘‘the principle of subsidiarity’’ as follows:
‘‘Subsidiarita¨tsprinzip [von lateinisch subsidiarius ‘zur Hilfe dienend’] : Prinzip, wonach jede
gesellschaftliche und staatliche Ta¨tigkeit ihrem Wesen nach fu¨r das Individuum oder die Familie
‘subsidia¨r’ ( unterstu¨tzend und ersatzweise eintretend) ist, die ho¨here staatliche oder gesellschaf-
tliche Einheit also nur dann helfend ta¨tig werden und Funktionen der niederen Einheiten an sich
ziehen darf, wenn deren Kra¨fte nicht ausreichen, diese Funktionen selbst wahrzunehmen. Das S. wird
v. a. von der katholischen (christlichen) Soziallehre als Ordnungsprinzip fu¨r das Verha¨ltnis
Individuum (Familie) Gesellschaft Staat und fu¨r dessen inneren Aufbau empfohlen.’’
108 Cf par 2 supra.
109 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on CD-ROM.
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assignment to but ‘‘subsidiary functions’’ instead?110 The simple (but not
simplistic) answer to this question is that with subsidiarity it is never
‘‘either . . . or’’ — never one-way traffic — but always ‘‘and . . . and’’ —
always two-way traffic. Subsidiarity entails an approach to hierarchical
relationships of authority which is ‘‘bottom-up’’ and ‘‘top-down’’
simultaneously.111 The ‘‘bottom-up’’ or ‘‘negative’’ perspective is that
subsidiaries should be left free (but not alone) to act or to have effect, as
long as what they bring about is not contrary to the common good. The
‘‘top-down’’ or ‘‘positive’’ perspective is that more comprehensive and
more intensely empowered doers should, for the sake of the common
good, render assistance (subsidium) to (and thereby empower) subsidi-
aries (but not absorb their ability) to act or to have effect.112
This perception of subsidiarity also enhances our understanding of
(and appreciation for) wholesome reliance on jurisdictional and
adjudicative subsidiarity in working with (and construing the existing
law in the light of) the Constitution. The Constitutional Court’s
judgment in Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security,113 for instance,
illustrates how due recognition of jurisdictional subsidiarity can result in
the empowerment of lower (and less comprehensive) fora to assume
primary responsibility for the constitutionally required development of
the common law. The judgment itself was an act of empowerment,
forthcoming from the Constitutional Court as highest (and most
comprehensive) forum in constitutional matters. Thereafter it was (and
has ever since been) left to other fora to initiate and proceed with the
actual development of the common law. The Constitutional Court will
step in only if in the developmental process, constitutionally enshrined
values and rights (as manifestations of ‘‘the common good’’) are
somehow compromised.
It is also more understandable now why it would be wrong to rely on
the ‘‘Mhlungu principle’’114 to justify anything smacking of a unilateral
declaration of independence of existing law from the Constitution (and
then to imply that adjudicative subsidiarity calls for such a modus
operandi). Since (the possibility of) constitutionally induced development
of the common law first materialised with the commencement of the
transitional Constitution on 27 April 1994, an irrevocable two-way flow
of traffic between constitutional values, rights and norms, on the one
hand, and values, rights and norms of the existing law, on the other, was
set in motion (albeit somewhat spasmodic at first). In the discussion
above reference was made to precedents in which the desired two-way
flow of the traffic was unduly impeded, examples being National Media
110 Cf the definition of Pearsall (ed) New Oxford Dictionary 1851 quoted in par 2 supra.
111 And not just (and essentially) a ‘‘ ‘van onder na bo’ benadering’’ as Van Wyk Subsidiariteit 254
suggests.
112 Audi (ed) Dictionary of Philosophy 886.
113 Supra.
114 S v Mhlungu supra par 59.
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Ltd v Bogoshi,115 S v Jackson116 and Commissioner of Customs and Excise
v Container Logistics (Pty) Ltd; Commissioner of Customs and Excise v
Rennie Group Ltd trading as Renfreight.117 Taking constitutional values
seriously, the outcome of at least the first two of these cases (fortunately)
was not all that disappointing, but the failure to recognise the
Constitution as source of values (and empowerment) in the development
of the existing law (in all three cases), was disappointing nonetheless.
Afrox Health Care Bpk v Strydom118 was mentioned and discussed as a
case in which development of the common law got stuck in the mud of
judicial rigidity — and that, moreover, as a result of a misguided and out
of place appeal to ‘‘constitutional rights and values’’. An alternative
adjudicative strategy was also suggested for that case, though it must
immediately be added that such a suggestion should not be understood to
be a one and only recipe: each individual case makes its own demands
and to try and format a template for all cases, will again just result in
rigidification. Aspects of the two Ngxuza judgments in the Eastern Cape
High Court119 and the Supreme Court of Appeal120 respectively, were
held up as judicial incarnations of a viable and exemplary contrast to the
judgment in Afrox.
The development of the existing law in the light of the Constitution is
too big a topic to give it the attention that it deserves with but a few
strokes of the pen in a single journal article. My rather modest objective
has thus merely been to present a credible argument in support of
involving and, indeed, invoking ‘‘subsidiarity’’ by its name in constitu-
tional interpretation and adjudication (and therefore, by implication, in
the development of the existing law in the light of the Constitution too).
Naming a phenomenon (or actually, as in the present case, just starting to
call it by its right name) while reflecting on its qualities and effects,
deepens our understanding of the possibly wholesome consequences that
(the implementation of) such a phenomenon may hold. This is what, for
instance, happened to the notion of ‘‘proportionality’’121 in limitation
jurisprudence, first recognised eo nomine by the Constitutional Court as a
guide to the limitation of rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights,122 and
subsequently written into the constitutional text (but without naming
it).123 I trust that this article has lifted the veil somewhat on how (the
implementation of) subsidiarity can contribute to the Constitution





119 Ngxuza v Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape supra; cf par 5 2 supra.
120 Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape v Ngxuza supra; cf par 5 2 supra.
121 Cf on ‘‘proportionality’’ in general, Kommers Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of
Germany 46-48 and Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 176-185.
122 S v Makwanyane 1995 6 BCLR 665 (1995 3 SA 391) (1995 2 SACR 1) (CC) par 104.
123 Cf s 36(1)(a)-(e) of the Constitution.
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and how the living law, empowered by (and imbued with values
emanating from the spirit, purport and objects of) the Constitution,
can grow creatively and innovatively.
OPSOMMING
Met ’n dictum van Kentridge WnR in S v Mhlungu 1995 7 BCLR 793 (1995 3 SA 867) (CC) par
59 as vertrekpunt, verken die skrywer die belang van subsidiariteit in (en vir) grondwetsvertolking
en beregting. Hy identifiseer Kentridge WnR se omsigtigheidsvermaning dat enige saak, siviel of
krimineel, verkieslik beslis moet word sonder om ’n grondwetlike geskilpunt daarvan te maak
(‘‘without reaching a constitutional issue’’) as ’n verskyningsvorm van beregtende subsidiariteit
wat van ’n hof verg om ’n a-(of minstens indirek) konstitusionele bo ’n streng konstitusionele wyse
van geskilberegting te verkies wanneer die beslegting van die regsvraag vir die eersgenoemde
ruimte laat (en nie noodsaaklikerwys die laasgenoemde verg nie). Dı´t onderskei die skrywer van
jurisdiksionele subsidiariteit wat manifesteer as voorkeur vir ’n minder intens bemagtigde en
minder omvattende (‘‘laer’’) forum om ’n (grondwetlike) saak af te handel wanneer dit ook al
moontlik is. Die potensiaal van altwee vorme van subsidiariteit om tot die ontwikkeling van die
bestaande (veral gemene-)reg by te dra op ’n wyse wat grondwetlike waardes en regte bevorder,
word ondersoek.
Na oorweging van moontlike voetangels wat ’n onbehoorlike beroep op subsidiariteit in die
grondwetsvertolker en beregter se pad kan plaas, word tot die slotsom geraak dat nadenkende
steun op subsidiariteit in grondwetsvertolking en -beregting die tweerigtingverkeersvloei tussen
grondwetlike waardes, regte en norme aan die een kant, en die waardes, regte en norme van (en
ingevolge) die bestaande reg aan die ander kant aansienlik kan help vlot. Om subsidiariteit by die
naam te noem en oor die eienskappe en effekte daarvan te besin kan, volgens die outeur, ons
verstaan van die heilsame uitwerking wat (die implementering van) subsidiariteit kan heˆ,
aansienlik verdiep (soos wat gebeur het met ‘‘proporsionaliteit’’ as maatstaf vir die beperking van
grondwetlike regte). Subsidiariteit kan daartoe bydra dat die Grondwet ’n bestaanswyse, eie aan
sigself, deur die lewende reg verwesenlik en dat die lewende reg, deur die Grondwet bemagtig en
besiel met waardes wat die gees, strekking en oogmerke van die Grondwet adem, kreatief en
vernuwend kan groei.
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